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ELECTIVE FETAL REDUCTION: THE ULTIMATE
ELECTIVE SURGERY
Mary V. Rorty, Ph.D. and JoAnn V. Pinkerton, M.D.
CASE:
A thirty-three year old woman presents with a ten week preg-
nancy. Ultrasound examination reveals two gestational sacs.
The mother expresses great distress at the thought of multiple
pregnancy. Although this third pregnancy is an intended and
desired one, she claims that the financial and emotional stress of
two babies at a time when she is still responsible for the care of
two young children at home will exceed family resources and
potentially lead to a breakup of her marriage. She has heard of
fetal reduction procedures and requests that her obstetrician
abort one of the two fetuses.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Fetal reduction surgery is both technically possible and increasingly
common in the context of infertility treatments for multiple fetal
pregnancies. Fetal reduction procedures "reduce" the number of poten-
tial live births in order to improve outcomes. Because of greater risk of
preterm delivery in multiple fetal pregnancies, some commentators have
argued that social, economic, and personal costs make it desirable to "re-
duce" multiple pregnancies whenever possible.2 Indeed, in the case
presented above, the mother requested the procedure to reduce naturally
conceived, apparently normal twins to a singleton birth.
The nature of contemporary medical practice is that interventions that
are discovered and perfected in one context are readily transferable to
others. If a specialist develops a high degree of skill in a procedure, the
decision to invoke the skill in a different context might be: "I can do it."
1. The case is a hypothetical composite based on cases described in the literature and
calls to our Ethics Consultation Service.
2. Emile Papiernik, Financing Multiple Births: A Personal Point of View, 35 INT'L J.
FERTILITY 330, 330-32 (1990); L. G. Keith et al., The Costs of Multiple Pregnancy, 36 Irrr'L
J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 109, 109-14 (1991).
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In the context of fetal reduction, however, the first question ought to be:
"Should I do this?"
The ethical import of selective reduction varies with the differing
clinical situations, and raises difficult issues for our society. Although
some sources suggest that "the ethical issues involved in multifetal preg-
nancy reduction or in selective fetal termination are somewhat different
from those involved in abortion,"3 much of the ethical controversy sur-
rounding such procedures exists because of the similarity between such
procedures and elective abortion.4 The above case raises the question of
whether selective reduction should be limited to those cases involving
strictly medical or genetic reasons for the procedure, or whether the pro-
cedure is appropriate electively, upon the mother's request, for the same
reasons that elective abortion is available, including matemal autonomy
and reproductive rights.
A. Origin of Fetal Reduction
Multiple pregnancies are associated with a high risk of preterm deliv-
ery. According to one source, in 1990, although only 9.7% of singleton
births were pre-term, 47.9% of twin births, and 87.9% of triplet and
larger multiple births, were premature.5 As a side effect of fertility treat-
ments, including ovulation-inducing drugs and assisted reproductive tech-
nologies such as in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), gamete intrafallopian
transfer ("IFT"), and zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT"),6 there has
3. ACOG Committee on Ethics, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction and Selective Fetal
Termination, Opinion 94, 38 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 140, 140-42 (1992).
4. Marian A. Ormont & Peter Shapiro, Multi-fetal Pregnancy Reduction: A Review
of an Evolving Technology and Its Psychosocial Implications, 36 PSYCHOSOMATICS 522, 528
n.23 (1995) (citing D. A. Greenfield & V. N. Walther, Psychological Considerations in Mu-
litfetal Pregnancy Reduction, 4 INFERTILITY & REPROD. MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 533, 533-
543 (1993)).
5. See B. Luke, The Changing Pattern of Multiple Births in the U.S.: Maternal and
Infant Characteristics 1973 and 1990, 84 OB-GYN 101 (1994).
6. In vitro fertilization procedures fertilize ovae outside of the woman. The ovae are
collected from the ovaries or fallopian tubes after hormone stimulation, fertilized by col-
lected semen in a petrie dish (in vitro), and then returned to the uterus for implantation.
The procedure sometimes is referred to as IVF-ET, in vitro fertilization and embryo trans-
fer. A later development, appropriate only for cases where the fallopian tubes are not
blocked, is gamete intrafallopian transfer. This is where extracted ovae are returned to the
fallopian tubes along with collected semen, and the fertilization takes place within the
body, instead of externally. Zygote intrafallopian transfer is another variation, where a
fertilized egg is returned to the fallopian tubes, rather than to the uterus. Although some
centers report higher rates, the success rate for pregnancies is about one in ten, with a
lower rate of live births. See generally A TEXTBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND
Elective Fetal Reduction
been an increase in multifetal pregnancies. In England, for instance,
there was a fourfold increase in quadruplets from 1946 to 1985,7 and in
Germany, a twenty-three fold increase from 1950 to 1980-primarily as-
sociated with assisted reproduction techniques.8 Since the first selective
delivery in 1978, doctors have developed various techniques to reduce the
number of fetuses in a pregnancy to improve the chances of a live birth.
The procedure, which has become standard, reduces the number of fe-
tuses in a multiple pregnancy to two.
Commonly used terms for this procedure of selective reduction in-
clude: selective feticide, selective birth, selective abortion, pregnancy ter-
mination, and pregnancy reduction.9 The terminology adopted by
University of Michigan researchers,' ° clearly distinguishes the procedures
allowing us to discuss the different ethical implications.
B. Multi-fetal Pregnancy Reduction
The term multi-fetal pregnancy reduction ("MFPR") is preferred by
the University of Michigan researchers" and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG") Committee on Ethics for
first trimester procedures performed as a result of "sheer fetal
number."12 Other terms include "embryonic reduction,"' 3 "selective em-
bryo reduction"' 4 (used by French researchers), "selective reduction of
multifetal pregnancies" (used by an Indian group),' 5 and "selective abor-
ASSISTED REPRODUCrION (Peter Brinsden & Paul Rainsbury eds., 1991) (providing details
about recent aided reproduction techniques).
7. Marilyn C. Frederiksen et al., Fetal Reduction: Is This the Appropriate Answer to
Multiple Gestation?, 37 Irrr'L J. FERTILITY 8, 37 (1992) (citing Three, Four and More: A
study of Triplet and Higher Order Births, in OPCS BIRTH STATISTICS SERIES FMI (B. Bot-
ting et al. eds., HSMO 1990)).
8. Id. (citing H. Grutzner et al., Hohergradige Mehrlinge in Wandel der Zeit, 50
GBURTSH FRAUENH 368 (1990)).
9. Id. at 9.
10. See Mark I. Evans et al., Multiple Gestation: The Role of Multifetal Pregnancy Re-
duction and Selective Termination, 19 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 345, 345-57 (1992).
11. Evans et al., supra note 10, at 347.
12. ACOG Committee on Ethics, supra note 3, at 142.
13. P. Boulot et al., Obstetrical Results After Embryonic Reductions Performed on 34
Multiple Pregnancies, 5 HUMAN REPROD. 1009, 1009 (1990).
14. J. Salat-Baroux et al., Is There an Indication for Embryo Reduction?, 7 HUMAN
REPROD. 67, 68-69 (1992).
15. Sadhana K. Desai et al., Selective Reduction of Multifetal Pregnancies in the First
Trimester Using Colour Doppler Ultrasonography, 8 HUMAN REPROD. 642, 642 (1993)
(other terms utilized by the Indian group include: "selective termination," "selective termi-
nation of multiple pregnancy," "selective transabdominal multifetal reduction," and "selec-
tive fetal reduction").
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tion in multiple pregnancy" (used by an Israeli group).16 At least three
basic procedures exist with some variations: transcervical embryo suction
(eight to eleven weeks), transvaginal embryo aspiration (six to seven
weeks), and transabdominal cardiac puncture with KCI injection (ten to
twelve weeks); the latter is the preferred method." Earlier procedures
involved cardiac puncture or air embolization with injections of calcium
gluconate or formaldehyde. The development of ultrasound imaging has
been crucial to the possibility of the procedures. Although losses of the
entire pregnancy were common in the early uses of these techniques, se-
ries in the last five years suggest that improved techniques and greater
familiarity with the procedures have decreased such losses.1 8
C. Selective Termination
Selective termination ("ST") is the term used by the University of
Michigan researchers for second trimester procedures dealing with fetal
abnormalities.' 9 ST involves fetal reduction of a targeted fetus in a multi-
ple pregnancy, usually for genetic reasons rather than for reduction as a
result of "sheer fetal number."2 When ST procedures are used, the preg-
nancy is usually further advanced than in the case of MFPR. Fetal abnor-
16. Joseph Itskovitz et al., Transvaginal Ultrasonography-Guided Aspiration of Gesta-
tional Sacs for Selective Abortion in Multiple Pregnancy, 160 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 215, 215, 217 (1989).
17. The methods of fetal reduction are distinguished: (1) by route of access through
the cervix, the vaginal wall, or the abdomen; and (2) by means chosen to terminate the life
of the fetus-through suction aspiration, which disrupts the fetal structure, or by injecting
something, air, or a chemical toxin like calcium glutonate, or potassium chloride.
Although a variety of techniques were attempted in the first years of the procedure, the
literature suggests that transabdominal injection of potassium chloride is becoming the
standard procedure. See Mitchell S. Goldbus et al., Selective Termination of Multiple Ges-
tations, 31 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 339, 340-45 (1988). See also Evans et al., supra note 10,
at 348. See also Itskovitz et al., supra note 16, at 216.
18. See generally Mark I. Evans et al., Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction and Selective
Termination 7 AM. J. OBSTmTRICS & GYNECOLOGY 126, 127 (1995) (referencing two sum-
mary articles: Evans et al., Efficacy of Transabdominal Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction:
Collaborative Experience Among the World's Largest Centers 82 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 61, 61-66 (1993), and Evans et al., Transabdominal Versus Transcervical and
Transvaginal Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction: International Collaborative Experience of
More Than One Thousand Cases 170 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 902, 902-09
(1994)). "[T]he outcome of MFPR in over 1,000 cases shows an 87% take-home baby rate
for experienced centers over the past few years. There is a steep leaning curve for the
procedure." Id. at 129.
19. See Evans et al., supra note 10, at 354.
20. See Evans et al., supra note 10; See also Richard L. Berkowitz et al., The Current
Status of Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction, 174 AM. J. OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 1265
(1996) (specifying that selective reduction is the appropriate terminology).
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malities that lead to such procedures could be chromosomal, biochemical,
molecular, or structural.21 The first ST procedure in 1978 by Aberg was
a cardiac puncture of a twin fetus with Hurler Syndrome.22 In 1981, the
literature reported termination of a twin with Down's Syndrome.23 In
both of these cases, the termination decision was based on medical or
genetic indications.
D. Selective Abortion
Selective abortion is a term reserved for abortions of singleton
pregnancies due to genetic or severe medical indications.24 This proce-
dure can be performed at varying gestational ages depending upon when
the diagnosis is made.
E. Elective Abortion
Elective abortion involves pregnancy termination that is based upon
reproductive choice, either in response to an unplanned, unwelcome, or
forced pregnancy, or as a personal decision of the pregnant woman.25 In
jurisdictions where elective abortion is allowed, any of the following con-
ditions may be indications of a need for this procedure: risk to the life of
the mother; risk to the mental or physical health of the mother; preg-
nancy caused by rape, incest, or other sexual crimes; effect of another
21. Peter G. Pryde et al., Triply Discordant Triplets: Probability, Management Options,
and Risks, 44 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 361, 361-63 (1992); Z. Appelman & B. Caspi, Chori-
onic Villus Sampling and Selective Termination of a Chromosomally Abnormal Fetus in a
Triplet Pregnancy, 12 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 215, 215 (1992). See generally Goldbus, supra
note 17 (among the indications for terminations reported include: trisomy 18; trisomy 21
(down's syndrome); acephaly, hydrocephaly or microcephaly; limb-body wall disruption;
meningomyelocele; and spina bifida).
22. Anders Aberg et al., Cardiac Puncture of Fetus with Hurler's Disease Avoiding
Abortion of Unaffected Co-twin, 2 LANCET 190, 190-91 (1978). Hurler's syndrome is an
example of a molecular problem where all the cells of the body lack an important enzyme.
The baby develops progressive and irreversible respiratory problems and other physical
problems; few of the organs develop normally and before the age of eight, death by heart
failure usually occurs.
23. See Thomas D. Kerenyi & Usha Chikara, Selective Birth in Twin Pregnancy with
Discordancy for Down's Syndrome, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1525 (1981) (reporting "a case
of twin pregnancy with discordancy for trisomy 21, in which aggressive approach was un-
dertaken for selective termination of the abnormal fetus by intracardiac puncture and ex-
sanguination at 20 weeks gestation").
24. Mark I. Evans et al., Selective First-Trimester Termination in Octuplet and Quadru-
plet Pregnancies: Clinical and Ethical Issues, 71 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 289, 293
(1988).
25. Malcolm N. Beck, Eugenic Abortion: An Ethical Critique, 143 CAN. MED. Assoc.
J. 181, 181 (1990).
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childbirth upon the health and welfare of the existing children and family;
jeopardy to the social position of the pregnant woman or her family; fail-
ure of contraception; and occasionally, although usually only during first
trimester, upon request.26
In contrast to the selective terminations described earlier in this article,
it is the request of the mother that makes an abortion elective, not the
characteristics of the fetus. Gestational age of the fetus is relevant, how-
ever, because as the gestational age increases, the number of acceptable
indications decreases. Current convention allows first trimester abortions
for a number of reasons, and abortions after twenty-two to twenty-four
weeks for very few reasons.27 Not all jurisdictions that permit abortion
acknowledge all of the indications listed above, and various restrictions,
including second physician's opinions or permission of third parties (in-
cluding parents or husbands), have been imposed at various times upon
the woman seeking the abortion. Currently, the United States has fairly
liberal legal limitations on abortion, although funding issues are problem-
atic. The type of procedure used is based primarily on gestational age of
the fetus and skill of the physician, and involves either "Suction Dilation
and Evacuation"2 8 to evacuate the uterus, or installation of an abortifa-
cient (such as prostaglandin, urea, or saline) which leads to loss of
pregnancy.29
F. Ethical Issues Involved with Fetal Reduction
Ethical variables of fetal reduction with potentially different moral im-
plications include the following:
(1) What is the gestational age of the fetus (first trimester, early sec-
ond trimester, previable)?
(2) Does one technique of reduction involve more or less possible pain
and suffering to the fetus, the pregnant woman, the physician, or to all?
(3) Is the pregnancy a "natural" one or resulting from third-party in-
terventions: (a) as a result of fertility enhancing drugs; or (b) as a result of
26. Rebecca J. Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies: Challenges and Opportunities, 3
INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 61, 68-69 (1989).
27. See generally id. (Cook groups indications, and indicates in her article, which coun-
tries follow which grouping: risk to life of woman; risk to physical health of woman; risk to
mental health of woman; risk to fetal health or handicap; unwanted pregnancy by rape or
other sexual crimes; social, socio-medical or socio-economic; and on request.).




IVF procedures,3" some of which include implantation of more than one
fertilized embryo?
(4) If one or more fetuses in a multiple pregnancy is to be reduced,
how is that fetus selected? Should the choice be based on characteristics
of the fetus, or by characteristics of the pregnancy (for instance, by loca-
tion within the uterus)?
(5) What is the intention of the action? (The usual proximate goal of
the intervention is to disrupt the natural course of pregnancy for some or
all of the uterine content.)
(6) What is the role of parental (especially maternal) wishes in deci-
sions to reduce a pregnancy? Is it by request of the parents, or by recom-
mendation of a physician with informed consent of the parents, including
information about possible risks to the rest of the pregnancy?
(7) Are there morally relevant differences between the various proce-
dures that have been described above, or should they all be viewed as
equally problematic because they all involve an explicit intervention in-
tended to bring about the death of a fetus?
This article will review the history of multifetal pregnancy reduction,
and explore the patient's and physician's perspectives. Further, this arti-
cle will review ethical analogies in order to develop a framework in which
to consider the request for fetal reduction in the case outlined at the be-
ginning of this article.
II. MULTIFETAL PREGNANCY REDUCTION
Many contemporary multiple pregnancies, with their inherent risk of
prematurity and disability, are iatrogenic. 31 "There would be no wide-
spread need for fetal reduction if various treatments for infertility were
not so successful."'32 For fertility specialists, the complications of mul-
tifetal pregnancy are both technological and social. The presence, in pre-
viously infertile women, of more fetuses than can safely be brought to
term is one of the ultimate ironies in medical care.33 It marks a failure of
the fertility procedure; in curing the deficiency of being unable to con-
30. See discussion infra Part I "Options."
31. latrogenic problems are those caused by the treatment. Multiple pregnancies are
iatrogenic because they are most frequently the result of medical fertility treatments-fertil-
ity enhancements or reimplantation of more ovae or embryos than can be safely carried to
term. Other examples of iatrogenic problems include: infections that an ill patient catches
while in the hospital, or infections from foreign objects left in the body after surgery.
32. Frederiksen et al., supra note 7, at 8.
33. Evans et al., supra note 25, at 292.
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ceive, the procedure goes too far by producing multifetal pregnancy.
Drastic measures possibly can save the fertility intervention; but, unlike
the "ethically positive" process of assisting infertile couples to conceive,
the means required to bring only one or two members of a multiple gesta-
tion to term, though perhaps justified, comparatively are "negative."
A. Options
Three options are available in the face of the failure of the fertility
procedure that results in multifetal pregnancy: (1) terminate the entire
pregnancy; (2) accept the situation and hope for a natural resolution of
some of the multiple gestations; or (3) invoke currently available tech-
niques for pregnancy reduction. Presented with these options, only the
third offers a good probability of achieving the intended goal of the fertil-
ity treatment. Thus, it seems appropriate to consider pregnancy reduc-
tion in connection with fertility treatments not as a separate procedure,
but as an unfortunate and sometimes necessary part of the fertility treat-
ment. This medical justification for MFPR is the strongest argument in its
favor.
A second argument for MFPR is the iatrogenic nature of the problem-
with the potential obligation-and potential guilt, implicit in third-party
interventions: "You broke it, you fix it!"34 The two most common sources
of iatrogenic multiple pregnancies are rather different in nature. High
doses of fertility drugs can over-stimulate the infertile woman's ovary to
produce more fertilized embryos than she safely can carry. The physi-
cian, as the provider of the fertility drugs, is of course implicated in the
result, but the degree of involvement is very different than in IVF proce-
dures. Multiple fetuses are anticipated as a complication in a small
number of cases. However, the multiple fetuses are not the intended re-
sult of the fertility drugs, and only occur indirectly as a result of the fertil-
ity drugs.
The IVF procedure typically involves fertilizing large numbers of ova,
and then choosing from among the pre-embryos an intentionally larger
number for return to the host than are expected to implant. A larger
number of pre-embryos are selected based on the assumption that not all
of the fertilized ova actually will implant. The pregnancy complication of
34. Because the multifetal pregnancy is a result of a desire for a live birth, an excess
zeal toward that end can lead to an overabundance of embryos being implanted. From the
standpoint of the treating physician, there may be a strong incentive to reduce the preg-
nancy to increase the chances of a live birth.
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multiple fetuses is, therefore, a direct result of the implantation of the
multiple embryos. As with over stimulation of the ovary, the result is an
unintended, but direct, result of the IVF procedure. Furthermore, even
in cases where only a viable number of pre-embryos are implanted, the
IVF procedure typically involves extra fertilized but unrematriated ova.35
The moral status (and disposal) of the leftover pre-embryos is also prob-
lematic. Thus, the physician involved in fertility procedures is: (1) the
proximate agent for the fertilization of the pre-embryos, (2) an interven-
ing agent in the otherwise randomly "natural" selection of which among
them would have a chance to implant, and (3) directly co-responsible for
the specific form of failure of the procedure which multifetal pregnancy
represents.
It is important to stress the differing degrees of involvement of the phy-
sician as causal agent in multifetal pregnancies in order to show how the
death of a fetus in MFPR is an integral part of a specific, and often
lengthy, chain of inter-related actions, all occurring because of one inter-
vention. The causal context of the multiple pregnancy can be an impor-
tant ethical variable.
Guidelines for multifetal reduction vary among practitioners. The re-
searchers at the University of Michigan rely on medical grounds in argu-
ing against reducing below twins in multiple pregnancies. This position is
widely, though not universally, followed. Other practitioners have rec-
ommended conserving triplets, while some physicians are willing to re-
duce to singleton fetuses upon an informed patient's request. Most
discussion of number limits occurs in the context of iatrogenic, as op-
posed to natural, multiple pregnancies, and invokes statistical outcome
35. Successful IVF procedures typically require more precision than natural cycles can
provide. Thus very early on, assisted reproduction involved several stages. First, oocyte
maturation and ovulation is timed precisely by injection of the hormones that accompany
ovulation in normal cycles, so as to be able to predict accurately the best time for harvest.
Second, natural cycles have been replaced by superovulation cycles-the maturation and
ovulation of more than one ovum at a time. A successful IVF treatment requires the im-
plantation of at least three or four ovae; in order to guarantee three or four undamaged
ovae, sometimes as many as twelve are encouraged to develop simultaneously. The ripe
ovae are removed from the ovaries by laproscopic surgery and then fertilized. Not all of
the ovas are fertilized, and of those that do not successfully fertilize, not all can be returned
to the uterus, least all be implanted. Because of high failure rates for implantation, the
standard number has become three or four. Many of the higher multiples are the result of
superovulation drugs without IVF procedures. See generally M.C. MACNAMEE & P.R.
BRINSDEN, Ultrasound in the Monitoring of Assisted Conception, in A TEXTBOOK OF IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION AND AssISTED REPRODUCTION 111-126 (P.R. Brinsden & P.A.
Rainsbury eds. 1992) (discussing the use of superovulation strategies in assisted
conception).
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data as to justify one decision or another.3 6
According to one group of researchers: "The approach.., has been to
allow the patient to participate in the decision, permitting the couple to
choose whether 1 or 2 or 3 fetuses are left, while fully informing them of
the potential risks and possible overall pregnancy outcome of their
choice."37 "The patient and her family, rather than the physician, should
make the decision."38 This approach is slightly less directive than the rec-
ommendation of the University of Michigan researchers that all mul-
tifetal pregnancies should be reduced to two fetuses with post delivery
mortality and morbidity as the deciding factor; it may be more appropri-
ate for natural, rather than iatrogenic, multifetal pregnancies.3 9
The literature on the subject of multiple pregnancies is rife with moral-
istic tales about the perils of high order multiple births in contemporary
health care. According to Frederiksen:
[O]ur last surviving quadruplets cost $1.2 million for maternal
and neonatal care after a delivery at 27 weeks gestation. All
children survived and are being followed in our developmental
clinic. The payment of this bill engendered enormous argu-
ments between the respective maternal and paternal insurance
carriers, and a document thicker than the Chicago telephone
book. Moreover, with more employers self-insuring their em-
ployees for health care costs, the occurrence of one higher order
multiple birth can endanger both the livelihood of the business
and that of the employee.40
Live birth of sextuplets in California was heralded by the press as a tri-
umph, although the death of three of the six received less publicity. Two
of the survivors are disabled, and the family supposedly is considering a
malpractice suit.4
1
Comparing differing sources on the question of the optimal number of
fetuses, it seems clear that various practices or centers have adopted dif-
ferent standards for that decision. If a patient in one center requests re-
duction to singleton, which may constitute a breach of local practice
standards, then it seems justifiable for practitioners to refuse to perform
the reduction and to refer the patient to another center that will comply
36. See, e.g., ACOG Committee on Ethics, supra note 3; Frederiksen et al.,'supra note
7; Evans et al., supra note 10; Evans et al., supra note 24.
37. Frederiksen et al., supra note 7, at 12.
38. Id.
39. Evans et al., supra note 10, at 350.
40. Frederiksen et al., supra note 7, at 13.
41. Evans et al., supra note 24, at 289-90.
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with the patient's request. The rationale invoked to justify practice stan-
dards is that the mortality/morbidity rates for twins are considerably
lower than triplets or quads but not significantly higher than for singleton
births. This is a completely defensible rationale and does not require any
further ethical justification. Medical professionals are not, and need not
be, in Evans' words, "merely technicians to our patients' desires."4 2 It is
possible that within the changing health care environment, third-party
funding will play a part in such decisions in the future.
Not all MFPR occur in the context of assisted reproduction. Unas-
sisted multiple pregnancies, though rare, do occur, and it is common in
the prenatal care of the 1990's to monitor pregnancies for early diagnosis
and early intervention if necessary or desired, of multiple pregnancies.
Diagnosis typically is made by ultrasound, and less commonly by clinical
examination of size greater than dates.43 Multifetal pregnancies do not
constitute a "failure" in the context of normal reproduction and most
physicians do not offer MFPR in these cases. A multifetal pregnancy is
considered a high risk pregnancy for the health of the mother and for the
survival and health of the potential offspring. Statistically, the risk rises
in direct proportion to fetal number. Does the high risk nature of natural
multiple pregnancy to the health of the fetuses constitute an ethically jus-
tifiable reason for opting for fetal reduction? For twins, triplets, quadru-
plets, quintuplets? How many is too many?
The choice of MFPR in this context is one resolution to a variant of the
"rationing" dilemma common to other health care contexts. Fetal reduc-
tion is a "lifeboat" intervention, a procedure intended to increase the
likelihood of survival of some of the fetuses to birth, rather than the
death or significant pain and suffering of all the fetuses.
Mary Faith Marshall suggests that while "choosing between individuals
.is both tragic and terrifying[, t]he alternative is not to choose-
thereby condemning all to death or to circumstance when not all can
live."'  In other words, refusing to choose essentially is equivalent to
42. Mark I. Evans et al., Selective Termination: Clinical Experience and Residual Risks,
162 AM. J. OSTERICS GYNECOLOGY 1568, 1575 (1990).
43. The terminology "size greater than dates" is a standard expression suggesting that
a clinical search for twins or multiples is indicated when the uterine distention is unexpect-
edly large for a pregnancy of a given estimated gestation.
44. Mary Faith Marshall, Patient Selection: Tragic Choices, in INTRODUCrION TO
CLINICAL ETHICS 195-205, 196-97 (John C. Fletcher et al., eds. 1995). See also Berkowitz et
al., supra note 20 (citing a similar justification: "The medical justification for performing
multifetal pregnancy reduction is philosophically similar to the 'lifeboat analogy,' which is
that some drowning individuals can be legitimately denied access to an overcrowded life-
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choosing the death of all concerned. Although the context of infertility
treatments creates a predisposition towards MFPR in order to increase
the chances of a live birth of a healthy infant, in the context of naturally
occurring multiple pregnancies, the risk to the pregnancy and parental
preference seem to be the only considerations. Following informed pa-
rental preference within the existing guidelines seems to be the best op-
tion. Although few physicians would offer parents the option of MFPR
for twins, they might mention it for spontaneous triplets.
B. The Patient's Perspective
From the standpoint of the person embarking upon infertility treat-
ments, considering multiple pregnancies as a potential side effect of the
treatment involves: (1) receiving explicit counselling about the possibility
of multiple fetal pregnancies before the fertility treatment is begun; (2)
reaching an explicit agreement in advance regarding what procedural op-
tions will be available to the parents, and (3) obtaining information about
the possibility or necessity of pregnancy reduction in the event that a mul-
tiple pregnancy occurs.
A poignant story, recounted by Frederiksen, and making a comparison
to Hester Prynne's situation in Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter,45 illustrates
the dangers of failing to prepare in advance for all contingencies. An
assisted reproductive technology resulted in an iatrogenic multifetal
pregnancy:
[The] patient came from a small community with a strong reli-
gious orientation which prohibited abortion and viewed fetal re-
duction as such. When [the woman] adopted an independent
stance and requested fetal reduction, she was disowned by her
family and thrown out of her home. The physician declined to
intervene at this point, thinking it best to "let nature take its
course." The family then reconsidered, returned with the pa-
tient, and supported her through the procedure only to have the
entire pregnancy lost three days later.46
The physician's reversal of his or her initial decision reveals the physi-
cian's surprise and confusion at the family's reaction. The family's rever-
sal was a response to a form of emotional blackmail by the physician
boat if bringing them aboard will cause it to sink and result in the loss of additional lives").
Id. at 1266.
45. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850) (Hester Prynne is the
heroine of the Scarlet Letter.).
46. Frederiksen et al., supra note 7, at 11.
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rather than an abandonment of their moral position. The outcome, loss of
pregnancy, probably added a sense of betrayal to their guilt for support-
ing the woman in what they viewed as an immoral action.
Honest and explicit discussion of the possible results of infertility treat-
ment would have illuminated the possible conflicts in this situation, and
might have helped to avoid the turmoil and suffering that this story de-
picts. Some religious groups avoid possible conflicts of this sort by pre-
emptive prohibitions of assisted reproductive technologies and infertility
interventions. In addition, many groups that do not object on principle to
infertility treatments nonetheless object on principle to abortion, and
might object to MFPR for the same reasons. If the modem Hester of
Frederiksen's case had been counselled adequately, then the physicians,
the family, and "Hester" herself would have been spared a great deal of
anguish.
C. The Physician's Perspective
From the standpoint of physicians offering infertility treatments, there
seems a general consensus: that (1) pregnancy reduction is, while possibly
defensible, morally troubling; (2) many multiple pregnancies are prevent-
able; and (3) "the first approach to this problem should be prevention."47
The great involvement of the physician in the production of the multiple
fetuses increases the quantity, but not the quality, of physician responsi-
bility. The risk of a bad outcome in multiple pregnancy is the major justi-
fication given by these physicians for intervention in both natural and
assisted pregnancies.
III. SELECrIVE TERMINATION
Selective termination differs from MFPR in two important ways. First,
the choice of which fetus will be reduced is not arbitrary. Instead, a par-
ticular fetus is targeted for termination on the basis of characteristics of
that fetus. Second, the termination is not intended to increase the
chances of a live birth (although it is hoped it will not reduce those
chances). Rather, it is intended to prevent the birth of an abnormal child.
Thus, selective termination is not a "lifeboat" decision; it is justified by
47. ACOG Committee on Ethics, supra note 3, at 140; Frederiksen et al., supra note 7,
at 13 ("We echo the plea of Papiemik and Evans for a swift and marked reduction in the
number of times multifetal pregnancy reduction must be thrust into our collective
consciousness.").
1996]
66 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:53
the principle that it is wrong to bring avoidable suffering into the world.48
Selective termination is a specific variation of eugenic abortion, and the
earliest reduction procedures fit in this category.
The permissible reasons for selective termination were quite strict
when the procedure was first developed. Today, the permissible indica-
tions for selective termination are more liberal because the risks of the
procedure are better known and the procedure is more common. Chro-
mosomal, biochemical, molecular, or structural characteristics of particu-
lar fetuses are among the justifications for targeting them for selective
reduction.
Sherman Elias and George Annas have suggested that in order to tar-
get a fetus for selective reduction or termination, the disease involved
must be so serious as to make life not worth living for the affected fetus.
49
It is not clear how widely this recommendation has been accepted. This
view clearly constitutes a more stringent test for selective termination
than any test currently utilized in our society for elective abortion in gen-
eral. The relative stringency of this approach may be explained in terms
of the risk facing the whole pregnancy of fetal reduction procedures in
multiple pregnancies. Although the risk varies depending on the center's
experience, the risk remains considerably higher than general rates of
spontaneous abortion.
There seems to be a well-established tradition in contemporary obstet-
rical practice of abortion to prevent the birth of a deformed or seriously
abnormal child.5" Like an ethical ski lodge, this tradition is perched on
an intersection of a number of rather slippery slopes. The major problems
with this approach include:
(1) What are the characteristics of a fetus that justify intervention to
prevent its birth?
(2) Are there any conditions of the pregnancy-multiple versus single-
48. See generally JOHN HARRIS, WONDERWOMAN AND SUPERMAN 71 (1992); See also
JOHN HARRIS, VALUE OF LIFE (1985) (giving this justification for selective termination or
what we have termed eugenic abortion).
49. SHERMAN ELIAS & GEORGE J. ANNAS, REPRODUCrIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW
128 (1987).
50. Beck, supra note 25, at 181:
Since 1967 few articles have addressed the rationale and indications for eugenic
abortion, and even fewer have questioned whether eugenic abortion should be
performed at all. The medical literature has betrayed a widespread, usually un-
stated assumption by the profession that fetal life should be terminated whenever
a serious congenital abnormality is strongly suspected.
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ton, artificial versus natural, desired versus undesired-that increase the
justifiability of intervention?
(3) Is there any ethical relevance to the conditions of diagnosis?
The diagnosis of fetal abnormalities is based on rapidly expanding tech-
nologies. Fetal imaging techniques, genetic screening and testing, and
chorionic villus and amniocentesis tests provide critical information to as-
sist in making judgments about the fetus' progress earlier in the course of
a normal pregnancy.5 Any of these technologies can produce more in-
formation than is necessarily relevant for judgments about the health of
the future child. Any of this information could be used to judge the qual-
ity of life of the future child. Not all of the indications for which mem-
bers of multiple pregnancies are aborted are "such as to make life not
worth living" for the affected fetuses. Aberg's technique of cardiac punc-
ture in 1978 made selective abortion in multiple pregnancies possible. It
is inevitable, although none the more desirable for its inevitability, that
additional characteristics of the fetus identifiable by the prenatal tests,
may serve as a possible indication for abortion. Once a single rationale
beyond severe pain and suffering is accepted, where does one stop?
There is widespread agreement in the literature regarding which char-
acteristics are and are not a valid basis for selective termination. Fore-
most among the forbidden reasons is gender choice, a "[reason] that
cannot be justified by ethical principles and that violate[s]" respect for fe-
tal life." 52 Although there is a great deal of resistance in the medical
profession against gender selection abortion, it is probably fair to note
that this resistance is much stronger in the western European societies
where the technology first developed. It is not so strongly argued in
many of the non-western societies into which that technology is ex-
panding. As increased educational and economic opportunities for wo-
men arise in other cultures, feminism may eventually have the same effect
in other cultures that are currently less than equitable in their treatment
51. Ultrasound scanning of embryo development has been a constantly improving
technique for detecting physical abnormalities since 1970. Currently ultrasound imaging of
fetal development has become a standard part of prenatal care in industrialized nations. It
has been judged to have no effect on fetal development, unlike x-rays which are not recom-
mended for pregnant women. The first technique of genetic analysis was amniocentesis,
available from 12 to 14 weeks of fetal development, which analyzed amniotic fluid for
genetic abnormalities. Its main advantage was the late date; sometimes the results of the
test were available only in the second trimester. Chorionic villis sampling utilizes material
from the placenta and can test for anomalies in the pregnancy. See generally BRINSDEN &
RAINSBURY, supra note 35, at 127-38 (ultrasound in the monitoring of assisted conception).
52. Evans et al., supra note 24, at 294.
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of women and are prone to allow gender selection.53
"Abnormality" varies among cultures, and is a conceptually vague no-
tion. Normalcy is a statistical category, a variable range within a popula-
tion, and everyone is aware that by picking the paradigm, narrowing the
population, or shifting the range, practically anything can be termed
"abnormal."
There are several concerns about the use of selective abortion to pre-
vent the birth of an abnormal or different fetus. First is the fear that
parents might be driven by an unrealistic quest for a "perfect" baby and
abort a potential child who falls short in some trivial respect-eye color
or body type. The "healthy normal baby" that represented the obstetri-
cian's success in the past may cease to be good enough. Another concern
expressed is the fear of stigmatizing existing individuals if the fetus' physi-
cal or mental traits are considered inadequate. The idea of choosing to
abort a fetus because of characteristics of that fetus, however central or
trivial, is itself morally questionable to some. For these people, the very
idea of eugenic abortion-of choosing who is "worthy" of being born and
who is not-is arrogant or immoral.
A. The Patient's Perspective
Selective termination in the case of the multiple fetal pregnancy is
medically more complicated and riskier to the mother. The procedure
also poses an additional risk to the surviving fetus or fetuses. Although
selective termination presents greater risks, the procedure poses ethical
issues similar to those associated with eugenic abortions in singleton
pregnancies.
Any fetal imaging or testing technologies raise the possibility of eu-
genic abortion. Ultrasound imaging has become part of standard prena-
tal care in middle-class America. For statistically at-risk populations,
additional tests routinely are recommended.
Eugenic abortion is associated implicitly, and often explicitly, with
53. As we write this paper there is a furor in the news media about China, where we
learn to our horror that eugenic abortions are practiced. The moral outrage surrounding
these accounts about the medical practices of the "barbarians" is rather notably lacking in
the articles in the medical literature that discuss the same practices in western societies,
where, as in Canada since 1967, abortions have officially been approved by physicians
when there is "a substantial chance that the child would be born with grave mental or
physical disability." Transactions of the General Council at the One Hundredth Annual
Meeting of the Canadian Medical Assoc. 69, (June 9-10, 1967) (CMA, Ottawa, 1967) (on
file with author).
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some of the currently available tests for fetal characteristics. In some so-
cieties the physician and the parents agree, as a condition for receiving
amniocentesis, that if certain genetic abnormalities are revealed, the fetus
will be aborted. This is partially an economic issue (the tests are expen-
sive), and partially a matter of simple logical (and medical) consistency:
why subject yourself to the expense and risk unless you are going to act
on the results?
There is strong evidence that parents are glad to have the information
provided by such prenatal technology. Decisions to abort are directly
correlated with the severity of the anticipated defect, and the method or
timing of the diagnosis is not an important variable in the decision to
abort. In one study of eighty cases of prenatal detection of abnormal
chromosomes, ninety-three percent of those with severe prognosis and
twenty-seven percent of those with questionable prognosis opted for ter-
mination of pregnancy.54 These results have been confirmed by other
studies." The results of such studies, of course, apply to the population
of people who have chosen to undergo chromosomal diagnosis of their
pregnancies. This is already a much smaller group than those who are
exposed to ultrasound examination, and to some extent they represent a
self-selected population with a predisposition to act on the results.
B. The Physician's Perspective
Even physicians who question elective abortions find it easier to accept
the idea of selective abortions, in the severe prognosis cases, where
preventing the birth of a severely damaged child will reduce the suffering
of both the parents and the child.56 If the justification for selective termi-
54. Arie Drugan et al., Determinants of Parental Decisions to Abort for Chromosome
Abnormalities, 10 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 483, 484, 486 (1990).
55. Dorothy Wertz, Ph.D., has proposed an international comparison of selective
abortion decisions following diagnosis of about ten different disorders, noting wide na-
tional variation in abortion rates. She concludes that parents make their decisions not on
the basis of medical information alone, but in a context of perceived social consequences.
See DOROTHY C. WERTZ, How PARENTS OF AFFECTED CHILDREN VIEW SELECTIVE
ABORTION, 161-189 (1994).
56. An interesting exception in the medical literature is the passionate plea by Beck:
"What is technologically possible is not always right." Beck, supra note 25, at 183. As
considerations against the practice of selective terminations, Beck cites, with special refer-
ence to the role of doctors in Germany in the 30's: the "proclivity of mankind to evil;" the
gestational age at which eugenic abortions are done, which approaches the (constantly
lowering) age of viability; the danger of contributing to the stigmatization of handicapped
people; the increasing tendency in law, which he decries, to accord legal autonomy to the
fetus; and the importance, to the credibility of the medical profession that its practitioners
"continue to demonstrate concern for the preservation of the lives of the sick and the
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nation is the moral principle that it is wrong to bring avoidable suffering
into the world, then the value achieved by selective abortion is directly
proportional to the severity of the defect. Thus, for easily correctable de-
fects there would be little justification for a selective abortion.
If the parents agree to receive information about possible genetic de-
fects, and in some cases agree to act upon such information if the progno-
sis is severe disability, the physician has little primary moral onus.
Physicians with objections to performing selective terminations, however,
would be well advised to avoid prenatal testing.
The social justification for selective abortion can be calculated in terms
of cost/benefit analysis. The costs to society of severely disabled citizens
are considerable, even if those costs are made the responsibility of the
particular family into which the child is born. As several commentators
have remarked, our society, although generally pro-natalist, is extremely
neglectful of children; the life of a disabled child born to a family of mod-
est means will be difficult and burdensome. In societies with strong social
welfare policies that provide for their disadvantaged individuals, it is ap-
propriate that society has a larger say in the decision to terminate preg-
nancy. It is further appropriate that counselling be more directive than is
the norm today in the United States.
In several cases of selective termination, reports of the procedure were
accompanied by various disclaimers suggesting that the physicians were
responding to "threats" on the part of the parents that unless the targeted
fetus was "reduced" the entire pregnancy would be terminated.57 This
rhetoric seems to be an attempt to justify selective termination on the
same basis as MFPR-an artifice by which the "lifeboat" analogy can be
invoked, and the physician can claim that here too, even in a less crowded
womb, it was necessary to kill some to save some. This convoluted rhe-
torical device is both unnecessary and inadequate. The justification for
intervention in the two procedures is not the same, nor need it be. The
analogy between the physiological improbability of all members of a
quadruplet pregnancy surviving to term and a parental decision seem far
fetched. The desire to make the two situations look analogous may speak
weak." Id. at 183-84. "Eugenic abortion," he concludes, "does not fall within the usual
rigors of good medical practice." Id. at 184.
57. Evans et al., supra note 10, at 354 (quoting T. Kerenyi & U. Chitkara, Selective
Birth in Twin Pregnancy with Discordancy for Downs Syndrome, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1525-27 (1981)). The mother asked for the termination of one twin, and the authors "ac-
ceded to the mother's threat to abort both the normal and the abnormal twins." Id.
9 Elective Fetal Reduction
more to the professional commitments of the physicians than to the ethi-
cal demands of the situation.
When summarizing the ethical considerations, the question was raised
regarding whether any characteristics of the pregnancy were morally rele-
vant. It has been suggested that with selective abortion, there is no mor-
ally relevant difference between intervention in a multiple or singleton
pregnancy. Selective termination, selective abortion in the context of
multifetal pregnancy, and eugenic abortion of singleton birth are virtually
equivalent on a moral and medical level, with the following qualifications:
(1) the danger-to surviving fetuses constitutes an additional risk to be
weighed in the balance of benefits and burdens when considering the pro-
cedure utilized in a multiple pregnancy; and (2) if the pregnancy in ques-
tion results from fertility procedures, the investment of the parents in a
given pregnancy probably is much higher, and will. make the personal
costs of a decision in favor of selective abortion much greater. 58
The later an abortion is performed, the greater the cost of the proce-
dure in terms of suffering-of the physician, of the mother, and possibly
of the targeted fetus. Amniocentesis as a diagnostic technology typically
does not provide results until late in the second trimester. For that rea-
son, although the literature prefers to address the ten to twelve week old
fetus, many selective terminations or selective abortions probably occur
much later in gestation and thus are more dangerous and more traumatic.
We have addressed selective terminations as a variety of eugenic abor-
tion, and have considered eugenic abortion as a procedure occurring in
the context of desired pregnancy. The hope, and in many cases the justi-
fied expectation, is that an interrupted pregnancy will be followed by a
successful pregnancy that will not increase the suffering, and will not,
therefore, need to be interrupted. Selective abortions in the context of
fertility treatments can not have such optimistic prognoses, and thus com-
bine tragedy with failure in a particularly poignant way.
IV. ELECTIVE ABORTION
What about the undesired pregnancy? Elective abortion raises a differ-
ent set of issues. Though not entirely without justification, elective abor-
tion is justified on different grounds than eugenic abortion, as no
characteristics of the particular fetus are relevant to the decision. Some
characteristics of the pregnancy, however, are relevant to the decision,
58. ACOG Committee on Ethics, supra note 3, at 38. See also Evans et al., supra note
24, at 292.
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most notably, the gestational age of the fetus. Generally speaking, the
earlier in the pregnancy that abortion is requested, the fewer impedi-
ments to abortion, the lower the risk of undesirable side effects, and the
lower the amount of suffering to all concerned.
In contemporary society, elective abortion is controversial. Although
the case described at the beginning of this article necessitates a discussion
of elective abortion, we do not wish to conflate elective abortion and
elective fetal reduction. We also do not wish to overshadow the discussion
of fetal reduction by opening that discussion to the larger abortion de-
bate. Our view is as follows: abortion is a bad option, where all other
options are worse, and always conjoined with some suffering; the suffer-
ing of involved health professionals, which is inevitable considering their
knowledge of the course of normal fetal development, is morally rele-
vant, if not morally determinative; every abortion represents a failure of
contraception, education, or social support, and sometimes all three. Wo-
men have a right to determine their reproductive choices, but that is con-
joined with an obligation to take responsibility for their sexual behavior
and health. Sexual activity, contraception, pregnancy, abortion, and birth
occur in a larger social context; physicians are not, and should not be, sole
reproductive resources, sole agents of social responsibility, or sole arbi-
ters of individual destinies.
V. CASE
Which of the procedures described above is most analogous to the re-
quest of the woman in the case described at the beginning of this article?
This case is confusing as the mother appears to be seeking either a fetal
reduction, or an elective abortion. She wants to be pregnant, but not this
way; she wants one baby, but she may well have two. On the other hand,
her "lifeboat" is not so crowded that the "reduction" of one twin medi-
cally is indicated. In fact, intervention would increase considerably her
chances of losing both fetuses.59
The difficulty of this situation is that one is tempted to think: "You can
not lose either way. If you intervene successfully she gets what she wants.
If you intervene and the pregnancy is lost, she might have chosen to abort
both instead of bearing both, and she will not be worse off. If you inter-
59. "For all 1074 pregnancies the pregnancy loss rate, defined as loss of the entire
gestation at up to 24 weeks of gestation, was 16.2% in 1988-1991; this dropped to 8.8% in
1991-93, showing a very steep, dramatic learning curve." Mark I. Evans et al., Multifetal
Pregnancy Reduction and Selective Termination, 7 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 126, 126-
29 (1995).
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vene and she gets what she asks for and feels bad about it later, it's her
own fault."
The mother's psychology of the situation exemplifies why maternal
threat to abort both twins often is mentioned in the literature. The threat
provides the physician with the justification of saving one as an excuse for
terminating the other; the physician as "technician to the patient's
desires '6° is off the hook.
But if "you can not lose either way," it is also very likely you can not
win, either. From the mother's point of view, the fetal number has be-
come an excuse for any ambivalence she feels about the pregnancy. If
she can not afford two more children, then it is very possible that she can
not afford one. Entering this complicated lottery, she may be able to
avoid confronting that question, and blame someone else for the out-
come. If the pregnancy is lost, it would be the doctor's fault, not her
choice. If the pregnancy is saved, but the child is a behavior problem, it
would be because the doctor chose the wrong twin to abort.
A. The Patient's Perspective
This mother needs to decide whether she wants to be pregnant. This
pregnancy-with two gestational sacs-is the pregnancy she has, and if
the emotional and financial strain will be too much, then she should elect
to end the pregnancy. If she decides she wants to remain pregnant, then
she should be advised that any intervention would threaten her preg-
nancy and would be irresponsible. It is possible that in the course of the
pregnancy one, or both fetuses, will die without intervention. The emo-
tional and financial stress of twins is not a new problem, and there is a
time-honored solution to it, adoption. Studies reveal that many twins are
raised apart.61 Adoption is not an easy choice for a woman, but then
neither is an abortion.
B. The Physician's Perspective
There is a modern solution, with the procedure developed in selective
60. Evans et al., supra note 42, at 1575.
61. Genetic researchers attempting to establish genetic links to various characteristics
often take twins separated at birth and raised in different families and environments as
their research population. Characteristics occurring more frequently in separated twins
than in unrelated pairs provide the basis for the hypotheses about genetic explanations for
those characteristics. Because such studies require statistically significant numbers, the re-
searchers suggest that there are considerable numbers of twin pairs separated at birth, for
whatever reason, and raised in different families.
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terminations. Aberg, originator of the procedure, chose to use it for eu-
genic abortion. Once Aberg's invention of the technique was widely
available, it became yery useful in the context. of fertility treatments; how-
ever, not without considerable ambivalence in the minds of the physicians
dedicated to live births who were embarrassed by multiple pregnancies
with bad prognosis. This available procedure, fetal reduction, could be
extended to elective abortion, and it is likely that it will eventually be so
extended. At the moment, however, such extension is not standard prac-
tice. What ethical considerations are relevant to the physician?
First, not all patient desires must be gratified. Elective abortions can
be done by idealistic, professionally responsible physicians who are pro-
viding an intervention that acknowledges women's reproductive responsi-
bilities and reduces human suffering. The considerations, maternal
circumstances, and gestational age, which are relevant medically, legally,
and morally in singleton elective abortions, may be appropriate here, but
if one considers the list, few of them apply in the same way to this case.
In terms of risk to maternal health, twins are not much riskier than single-
ton births, which is why many physicians are willing to reduce to twins in
multiple fetal pregnancies. It is unlikely that the procedure would be re-
quested for cases of pregnancy from rape or incest. In particular, elective
abortion "upon request" is very hard to justify in this case.
Second, it seems important that the physician understand that what he
or she is doing is an elective-not a eugenic-abortion, and not a "preg-
nancy reduction." Medically, this is not a pregnancy that needs to be re-
duced. Calling it a reduction instead of an abortion would only
contribute to the confusion and self-deception. In our case, there is no
medical indication. Rather, the request originates with the woman, who
confronting her reproductive choice, questions whether this is one of her
options.
Third, one danger of this situation is to turn an elective procedure into
a eugenic procedure. Because both fetuses are apparently normal, there'
is no medically indicated reason for choosing between them; but a choice
nevertheless will have to be made. A physician who has agreed in princi-
ple to perform such a procedure must find some characteristic, any char-
acteristic, by virtue of which he or she could choose between the two fetal
sacs. The assumption in this case is that although one might be male and
one female, one blue eyed and one brown eyed, one blond and one bru-
nette, there are no morally relevant differences between the two fetuses.
Any characteristic that is a determinant is a discriminator. Size might be
a morally neutral difference; location in the womb might be as well. Gen-
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der, in our society, is not a moral difference and neither is hair or eye
color.
*Fourth, moral problems,: like' medical problems, are often iatrogenic.
In the case of innovative or experimental procedures, few patients know
about them in advance and are responsible for introducing them into con-
versations with their physicians. Instead, the physician is typically the ini-
tiator of such discussions. The forced option of choosing between
apparently normal fetuses, which may present a moral dilemma to a par-
ent asked to make the decision, is a complication of, as well as a solution
to, a different situation. Often patients who request various procedures
have been told that there is an experimental technique, but they have not
been counselled responsibly about costs, risks, disadvantages, and pro-
portion of benefit to burden of the technique. Often "this experimental
technique" is presented to the patient just as a technique or technology,
stripped of its moral trappings. Moral implications, however, are part of
medical practice. Unless the moral cards are on the table, everyone will
end up feeling betrayed.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to justify pregnancy reduction in the naturally occurring
pregnancy described at the beginning of this article. First, this is not a
fetal reduction, which is justified on the "lifeboat" principle of sacrificing
some to save others. Twin pregnancy is not considered a "lifeboat" risk.
Further, the pregnancy is a natural, not an artificial, one so no third party
is responsible for "fixing" failures.
Second, this is not a selective termination, which is justified as a
method of preventing suffering. There are two apparently normal fetuses
that have a good chance of developing into normal births. Any justifica-
tion for aborting one fetus would count as a justification for aborting
both. Any justification for keeping one fetus would count as a justifica-
tion for keeping both. There is no morally justified reason for choosing
to abort one rather than the other. An arbitrary decision to abort one
fetus over another is contrary to good medical practice.
Third, this situation is closest to an elective abortion, which is a re-
sponse to a maternal decision to interrupt a pregnancy. The request
originates from the pregnant woman rather than a medical recommenda-
tion to improve potentially the outcome for the fetuses.
Fourth, the considerations that are indications for elective termination
of pregnancy are much weaker when applied to reduction of pregnancy.
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At the same time, the considerations that have been raised against elec-
tive abortion are much stronger against reduction of pregnancy. The bal-
ance weighs against elective fetal reduction. The social discomfort
surrounding genetic screening and prenatal testing, despite strong medi-
cal support, suggests that selective abortions generally are perceived as an
undesirable social practice and dangerous social precedent; and in this
case, any elective reduction would be a de facto selective reduction.
Fifth, there is currently no precedent for extending the procedures de-
veloped in the context of selective termination to elective abortion. Any
physician who has developed policies in his practice concerning minimum
numbers of fetuses to be reduced, has no obligation to breach practice
standards to meet the arbitrary request of a patient. We endorse heartily
Evans' resistance to becoming "technician to our patients' desires,"62 and
think Beck was well advised to warn "this great and historical, learned
profession should not ... [allow] itself to become either the unwitting
agent of public policy or the automatic servant of popular demand."63
Sixth, although no individual patient request justifies breaching current
standards of practice, it may be appropriate to ask whether any reason
could arise in the future to establish elective fetal reductions of the sort
exemplified by our case as approved social and medical practice. The
kind of justification that would be appropriate includes considerations of
reproductive control of the sort that has led, in recent years, to increasing
acceptance of elective abortion. Should we acknowledge a reproductive
"right" for a woman to determine not only whether to become pregnant
and to carry to term, but also how many, and possibly what kind, of child
to bear? What limits are appropriate for a society to place on a woman's
power to decide? Are there improvements in the safety and availability
of current procedures for the mother and for the surviving fetus that
would be necessary prior to any widespread acceptance of this procedure
on a purely elective basis?6'
62. Evans et al., supra note 42, at 1575.
63. Beck, supra note 25, at 184.
64. The extension of fetal reduction to an elective procedure recently has been explic-
itly recommended, as in Frank A. Chervenak et al., Three Ethnically Justified Indications
for Selective Termination in Multifetal Pregnancy: A Practical and Comprehensive Manage-
mentStrategy, 12(8) J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS, 531, 531-36 (1995). The authors
argue that a woman's desire to achieve a pregnancy that results in a singleton birth is an
ethically justifiable ground for reduction, claiming it is "consistent with existing public pol-
icy in the United States and in Great Britain." Id. at 535. Alison Hall, however, denies
that elective reduction is legal in Great Britain, and claims that there is a disparity between
current medical practice in Great Britain and current law in that jurisdiction. Alison Hall,
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The case at the beginning of this article appears, on its face, to be a case
for MFPR for medical reasons, but turns out to be a maternal request for
an elective reduction for social reasons. This is simply using technology
to perform an elective abortion, in this instance, on only one fetus while
attempting to not interfere with the second fetus. There are no significant
medical or genetic threats to the fetuses or the mother that would justify
selective termination. In naturally occurring multiple twin pregnancy,
there is no predisposition to assist a complication from an iatrogenic in-
tervention. Although it is technically possible to perform a reduction, it
is not ethically preferable to do so. Current standards of practice recom-
mend reducing to twins, and until more information has been gathered on
the safety and efficiency of this relatively novel and experimental proce-
dure, it seems premature to extend it to an elective procedure. Selective
abortion or reduction (for fetal anomalies) currently is accepted as one
subset of elective abortion, but respecting the issues of autonomy and
responsibility involved in elective abortion do not remove the onus on
medical professionals to encourage responsible decision making.
Our fear is that if selective reduction becomes available upon maternal
request for naturally occurring twins, the rationale for performing eu-
genic abortion would fail because the procedure would be available for
cosmetic or trivial reasons. We would recommend this woman's choice
be to terminate the pregnancy or continue the pregnancy. She does not
have the option of selective reduction unless her life or health, or the
lives of the fetuses, are at risk. Others will argue that because elective
abortion is legal and widely available, why not elective, selective
abortion?
As elective abortion is legal and widely accepted, why not elective fetal
reduction? Our rationale is based on: the lack of iatrogenic nature of the
multiple pregnancy; the lack of problematic characteristics of the fetus to
allow the choice of one fetus over the other; the risk to the surviving fetus
where there is not a risk from fetal numbers; and, the slippery slope to
eugenic abortion for trivial reasons.
Selective Reduction in Pregnancy: A Legal Analysis, 22 J. OF MED. ETHics 304, 304-08
(1996).
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